“Oh, great,” I thought when news broke of the release of GPT-4. “Higher-quality deception.”
Most of the Internet disagreed; having gone mad only a few weeks ago over ChatGPT, everyone’s now agog over this latest model. It passed all these tests!
One exception was the journalist Paris Marx, who commented on Twitter: “It’s so funny to me that the AI people think it’s impressive when their programs pass a test after being trained on all the answers.”
Agreed. It’s also so funny to me that they call that “AI” and don’t like it when researchers like computational linguist Emily Bender call it a “stochastic parrot”. At Marx’s Tech Won’t Save Us podcast, Goldsmith professor Dan McQuillan, author of Resisting AI: An Anti-fascist Approach to Artificial Intelligence, calls it a “bullshit engine” whose developers’ sole goal is plausibility – plausibility that, as Bender has said, allows us imaginative humans to think we detect a mind behind it, and the result is to risk devaluing humans.
Let’s walk back to an earlier type of system that has been widely deployed: benefits scoring systems. A couple of weeks ago, Lighthouse Reports and Wired magazine teamed up on an investigation of these systems, calling them “suspicion machines”.
Their work focuses on the welfare benefits system in use in Rotterdam between 2017 and 2021, which uses 315 variables to risk-score benefits recipients according to the likelihood that their claims are fraudulent. In detailed, worked case analyses, they find systemic discrimination: you lose points for being female, for being female and having children (males aren’t asked about children), for being non-white, and for ethnicity (knowing Dutch a requirement for welfare recipients). Other variables include missing meetings, age, and “lacks organizing skills”, which was just one of 54 variables based on case workers’ subjective assessments. Any comment a caseworker adds translates to a 1 added to the risk score, even if it’s positive. The top-scoring 10% are flagged for further investigation.
This is the system that Accenture, the city’s technology partner on the early versions, said at its unveiling in 2018 was an “ethical solution” and promised “unbiased citizen outcomes”. Instead, Wired says, the algorithm “fails the city’s own test of fairness”.
The project’s point wasn’t to pick on Rotterdam; of the dozens of cities they contacted it just happened to be the only one that was willing to share the code behind the algorithm, along with the list of variables, prior evaluations, and the data scientists’ handbook. It even – after being threatened with court action under freedom of information laws, shared the mathematical model itself.
The overall conclusion: the system was so inaccurate it was little better than random sampling “according to some metrics”.
What strikes me, aside from the details of this design, is the initial choice of scoring benefits recipients for risk of fraud. Why not score them for risk of missing out on help they’re entitled to? The UK government’s figures on benefits fraud indicate that in 2021-2022 overpayment (including error as well as fraud) amounted to 4%; and *underpayment* 1.2% of total expenditure. Underpayment is a lot less, but it’s still substantial (£2.6 billion). Yes, I know, the point of the scoring system is to save money, but the point of the *benefits* system is to help people who need it. The suspicion was always there, but the technology has altered the balance.
This was the point the writer Ellen Ullman noted in her 1996 book Close to the Machine”: the hard-edged nature of these systems and their ability to surveil people in new ways, “infect” their owners with suspicion even of people they’ve long trusted and even when the system itself was intended to be helpful. On a societal scale, these “suspicion machines” embed increased division in our infrastructure; in his book, McQuillan warns us to watch for “functionality that contributes to violent separations of ‘us and them’.”
Along those lines, it’s disturbing that Open AI, the owner of ChatGPT and GPT-4 (and several other generative AI gewgaws) has now decided to keep secret the details of its large language models. That is, we have no sight into what data was used in training, what software and hardware methods were used, or how energy-intensive it is. If there’s a machine loose in the world’s computer systems pretending to be human, shouldn’t we understand how it works? It would help with damping down imagining we see a mind in there.
The company’s argument appears to be that because these models could become harmful it’s bad to publish how they work because then bad actors will use them to create harm. In the cybersecurity field we call this “security by obscurity” and there is a general consensus that it does not work as a protection.
In a lengthy article at New York magazine, Elizabeth Weil. quotes Daniel Dennett’s assessment of these machines: “counterfeit people” that should be seen as the same sort of danger to our system as counterfeit money. Bender suggests that rather than trying to make fake people we should be focusing more on making tools to help people.
The thing that makes me tie it to the large language models that are producing GPT is that in both cases it’s all about mining our shared cultural history, with all its flaws and misjudgments, in response to a prompt and pretending the results have meaning and create new knowledge. And *that’s* what’s being embedded into the world’s infrastructure. Have we learned nothing from Clever Hans?
Illustrations: Clever Hans, performing in Leipzig in 1912 (by Karl Krali, via Wikimedia.
Wendy M. Grossman is the 2013 winner of the Enigma Award. Her Web site has an extensive archive of her books, articles, and music, and an archive of earlier columns in this series. Follow on Mastodon or Twitter.
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